INTRODUCTION
I am honored to contribute to this volume on the Stanford Organization Theory Renaissance, though I must admit that I am a bit sheepish about being listed as a faculty member. I was indeed on the Stanford faculty, from 1997 to 2001. However, the experience for me was more of a developmental one in which I learned from my colleagues, who consisted of the leading lights in the sociology of organizations and organization theory generally. This period was as formative for me as was the prior period, when I was a student in the formal sense. I find it easy to point to specific ideas that I encountered during my stay at Stanford and to trace how they shaped my perspective on key questions of social and economic organization. In the following, I will discuss one example of this Stanford influence. In particular, I build on ideas developed at Stanford during the 1970s and 1980s (and which I came to appreciate during the 1990s) to make progress on a puzzle that did not occupy center stage there and then. Nothing testifies to the value of a theory or approach than its ability to generate insight well beyond the original questions for which it was originally developed. The puzzle that forms the focus of this essay is the question of why formal organizations tend to be hierarchical, such that certain key rights are concentrated in the hands of a small fraction of organization members, with sub-rights (the general rights as they pertain to specific functions or divisions) delegated in highly restricted ways. The puzzle as to why these key rights -which Williamson (1975) summarizes as ''fiat'' and which encompass (a) membership-rights (the right to control the organization's boundary through hiring and firing) and (b) decision-rights (the right to issue orders to those lower in the hierarchy, with the expectation by all concerned that such orders are legitimate) -are concentrated, has never occupied center stage among organizational sociologists. Perhaps this neglect is justified. Especially if one begins with Weber's definition of bureaucracy (see Scott, 2002, pp. 43-50) , formal organizations seem to be hierarchical by definition. But even if it is tautological to assert that formal organizations are hierarchical, this begs the question of why and in what respects this tautology holds. Many business firms are now described as eschewing formal hierarchy, with such deviations from hierarchy often cited as being responsible for such firms' success.
1 And even organizations that look quite hierarchical ''on paper'' tend to feature much behavior that deviates from the formal hierarchy. As Granovetter (1985, p. 502) quipped, ''it hardly needs repeating that observers who assume firms to be structured in fact by the official organization chart are sociological babes in the woods. ' ' And yet, even if formal organizations are less hierarchical (or more effective when less hierarchical) than a naı¨f might suppose, it still appears that all formal organizations share certain hierarchical features. Note, in particular, that while managers may choose not to exercise their membership-or decision-rights, those rights still belong to them. As Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999, p. 56 ) stress, ''subordinate decision-rights are loaned, not owned.'' That is, even the most avowedly egalitarian organization only suppresses its rights to control membership and give orders; it cannot constitutionally give up these rights. As Perrow (1986, p. 129) puts it, ''direct controlsy always exist.'' But why is this? Why are formal organizations fundamentally hierarchical?
In this brief essay, I develop an answer to this question by focusing on a third right, which is analytically distinct from membership-and decisionrights, and which (I contend) is invariably concentrated in the hands of a very small fraction of organization members -that is, the right to speak on behalf of the organization. I argue that the concentration of this right
(as well as the right to delegate it) follows as an unrecognized implication of Hannan and Freeman's (1984) sociological theory of formal organizations, which they present (but do not really present as such) in their classic article ''Structural Inertia and Organizational Change'' (henceforth, HF84). In short, HF84 argue that structural inertia is a byproduct of what makes formal organizations evolutionarily adaptive -that is, their ''accountability and reliability.'' I argue that two key factors are necessary to make organizations accountable and reliable -(a) the ability to credibly commit to outside stakeholders and (b) the ability to converge on common routines for coordination -and each requires that the organization have a clear identity, either to outsiders (to achieve external commitment) and/or to insiders (to provide the basis for internal accountability and thereby achieve internal coordination). And insofar as a collective actor will not have a clear identity unless it is clear who can speak on its behalf, it follows that such rights will be highly concentrated, and the delegation of sub-rights (e.g., who can speak on behalf of a division) will be sharply delimited as well. Finally, just as HF84 understand inertia to be a byproduct of accountability and reliability, I argue that the more obvious hierarchical features of formal organizations (e.g., the concentration of membership-rights and decision-rights) can be derived from the more subtle but more basic need to concentrate voice-rights.
In what follows, I will fill in this outline a bit more. In the first section, I summarize the contribution of HF84 and distill the elements that can be applied to the current problem. In so doing, I will make the case that HF84 should be read as part of a broader Stanford-based sociological theory of the formal organization, in that it developed from engagement with other lines of thinking that were based at Stanford. I then propose a modified form of their argument, which suggests why organizations tend to concentrate their ''voice-rights'' in a small number of hands, and then draw out the implications for the puzzle at hand. I conclude by briefly treating objections.
HF84: STRUCTURAL INERTIA AS BYPRODUCT OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION
To recall, the central objective of HF84 was not to propose a theory of the formal organization and it certainly was not to clarify why such organizations tend to be hierarchical. Rather, their goal was to defend the main premise of organization ecology, as articulated in their classic 1977 article -that is, that organizations could be assumed to be ''structurally
inert'' such that ''most of the variability in organizational structures comes about through the creation of new organizations and new organizational forms and the replacement of old ones '' (HF84, p. 150) . Why might such a premise need defense? For starters, HF were clearly under the impression that this premise was not popular on The Farm. They cite both Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) resource dependence theory and Meyer and Rowan's (1977; cf., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) new institutionalism as ''variants y (of) rational adaptation theoryy (which propose) that organizational variability reflects designed changes in strategy and structure of individual organizations in response to environmental changes, threats, and opportunities'' (ibid.). Moreover, they see themselves as answering a challenge by March (1981) , who appears to reject the assumption of structural inertia out of hand: ''y it is not that organizations are rigid and inflexible, but that they are impressively imaginative'' (p. 150). While Stanford-based organization theorists may not have been on the same page when it came to organizational change/inertia, it is clear that they were engaging with one another. And especially in hindsight, such engagement seems to have been highly productive. In particular, it is noteworthy that HF84 credit Scott (1981, p. 204) for the suggestion (which they then develop further) that structural inertia pertains to ''core'' features of organizations rather than peripheral ones. And HF84 argue that March's observations on organizational change are in fact compatible with their view that while organizations undergo significant change, such change is effectively ''random with respect to adaptive value'' (HF84, p. 150). Moreover, two related and central elements of HF's approach clearly echo Meyer and Rowan (1977) : (a) the idea that technical efficiency is not the right address to seek the basis for commonly shared features of formal organization; and (b) the emphasis on how organizations legitimize or account for their actions quite apart from what they actually do.
Yet, while HF84 clearly owes much to Stanford-based influences, it is important to appreciate its signal contribution. In particular, whereas HF's landmark 1977 article (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) was premised on the observation that organizations tend to be inert (i.e., they change slowly relative to the pace of environmental change), HF84 make the theory more compelling by transforming structural inertia from an axiom into a theorem. That is, they derive structural inertia from more basic principles. They accomplish this by hoisting themselves on their own petard and addressing a challenge to their work which no one had actually raised but which, they argue convincingly, needed to be addressed: Since features of organizations should not survive for long if they are not adaptive, it follows that if
organizations tend to be structurally inert, then inertia is adaptive. But why would this be? And how could this be, when it seems plain that organizations should change when they face significant environmental threats. HF's inspired move is to suggest that while inertia itself is not adaptive, it is a byproduct of organizational characteristics, which are adaptive. In particular, they stress that modern society and economy favor actors that are reliable and/or accountable. By reliability, they mean the ''capacity to generate collective actions with small variance in quality'' (HF84, p. 153). And they argue that while ''from the perspective of the performance of a single, complex collective action, it is not obvious that a permanent organization has any technical advantage'' (ibid.), it is the ''distinctive competence of (permanent, formal) organization'' that it is highly reliable in the above sense. By accountability, they mean the ability ''to document how resources have been used and y reconstruct the sequences ofy decisions'' to show that ''appropriate rules and procedures'' were followed (ibid.). And as did Meyer and Rowan (1977) , HF84 observe the spread of ''general norms of rationality in the modern world,'' which increase the demand for accountable actors in the above sense. Finally, since the organizational features necessary to produce reliability and accountability also produce structural inertia as a byproduct, it follows that organizations will tend to be structurally inert. HF84 summarize these features as ''reproducibility,'' which they define as satisfaction of the imperative that ''structures of roles, authority, and communication must bey very nearly the same today [as] yesterday'' (p. 154). Fig. 1 is a sketch of their argument.
It is worth underlining two key features of HF's approach. First, while their goal was the perhaps modest one of justifying the assumption of structural inertia (by turning it into a theorem derived from the more primitive axiom of selectivity), they developed a sociological theory of the formal organization, one that is clearly compatible with other Stanfordbased approaches, particularly the institutionalism of Meyer and Rowan In what follows, I build on each of these features to make some progress on the question of why formal organizations are hierarchical. In particular, I follow the basic form of HF84's argument, albeit while suggesting that we recast the organizational characteristics that make organizations reliable and accountable. I then sketch how this modified version of HF84's framework suggests that: (a) in order to be reliable and accountable (and thereby enhance selectivity), formal organizations must concentrate the right to speak on behalf of the organization; and (b) the need to concentrate ''voice-rights'' creates, as a byproduct, a need to concentrate control of membership-and decision-rights.
CLEAR IDENTITY AS PRECONDITION FOR REPRODUCIBILITY
As depicted at the right of Fig. 2 , my first modification of HF84's model is to distinguish reliability from (external) accountability as distinctive criteria for selection. The main reason for doing so is to highlight the fact that they solve different problems. Reliability is demanded of an actor when those who turn to that actor for goods or services seek to minimize their risk of a bad draw. Such ''audiences'' will place a premium on actors who can consistently meet a quality threshold. The preference for accountable actors is related to the demand for reliability but is distinct from it. ( C ) E m e r a l d
To paraphrase March (1994) , the issue is one of ''appropriateness'' rather than ''consequences.'' If performance always reached the desired threshold, there would be no reason for the audience to question the procedures that were followed. But even a highly reliable actor may sometimes fail to reach such a threshold. Moreover, in many cases, performance criteria are ambiguous or are subject to change ex post by those who review the audience's decisions. Under such conditions, it is useful to be able to ''take cover'' in the appropriateness of the procedures followed. To be sure, appropriate procedures are not random with respect to consequences. Rather, these procedures seem appropriate because they are the reasonable, most accepted ways of generating the desired performance -even if they often do not work for the specific task. The second reason for distinguishing reliability from accountability in this way is that we can more clearly see that ''reproducibility'' addresses two related but distinct organizational challenges, which are distinguished in Fig. 2 : (a) to coordinate action among employees in such a way as to generate reliable (high) performance and (b) to commit the organization to following reasonable procedures. While this first challenge is evident to anyone who has ever tried to ''herd cats,'' the second challenge is perhaps more subtle. It can be stated as follows: insofar as actors will be preferred when they can ''document how resources have been used and y show that appropriate rules and procedures'' have been followed (HF84, p. 153), this raises the question as to how an audience will know ex ante that the organization will be accountable in this fashion ex post. To address this issue, the actor must take steps to commit itself, in the (Schelling, 1956; cf., Becker, 1960; Selznick, 1957) sense of making it more costly to act ''inappropriately.'' That is, outsiders can count on an actor to follow appropriate procedures when we see that it would be more costly for it to act inappropriately (see King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010, pp. 292-294) .
What is then about formal organizations, as distinct from (sets of ) actor(s) that are not formal organizations, which allows them to coordinate internally sufficiently well to perform reliably? And what allows them to commit themselves to acting appropriately? HF84 do not address these questions directly, but they provide a critical lead when they distinguish between the organizational core and periphery and suggest why core elements are so difficult to change:
Universities, for example, are constantly changing the textbooks used for instruction. They do so in an adaptive way, keeping up with the constantly evolving knowledge bases of their various fields. Persuading a university faculty to abandon liberal arts for the sake of vocational training is something else again. Why would the university's curriculum be
so difficult to change? A number of answers come quickly to mind. The curriculum embodies the university's identity with reference both to the broader society and to its participants (i.e., faculty, students, staff, administration, alumni). The kinds of courses offered and the frequency with which they are offered serve as a statement of purposey. (p. 155; italics added) Thus, HF84 suggest that an organization's identity is at the heart of its capacity for reproduction (via internal coordination and external commitment), and this thereby increases its survival prospects (via greater reliability and accountability) and correlatively, its structural inertia. But what is an organizational identity and how does it help the organization achieve such feats? Following Zuckerman (2010), we may define identity as consistent placement, where such placements (Stone, 1962 ) pertain both to extension (i.e., how much space does the entity take up?) and location (where is it relative to other entities?), and where such consistency pertains both to its stability over time and agreement among observers (including but not limited to the subject of that identity). HF84 suggest two sets of observers: internal members (e.g., employees) and external stakeholders (e.g., customers, investors). That is, it is useful to distinguish between an organization's internal identity and its external identity (e.g., Bouchikhi & Kimberly, 2003; Tripsas, 2009; cf., Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994) , which may be sharply decoupled from one another (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) . Of course, it is possible for either insiders or outsiders to be utterly confused (individually and/or collectively) as to how to place the organization relative to others (e.g., Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Tripsas, 2009) . And clearly, such confusion is highly problematic.
Indeed, if observers disagree as to the boundaries of an organization and how it should be placed relative to others (Is it a church, a synagogue, or a mosque? Does it sell high-end or low-end products?), they will not be able to decide which actions to attribute to the organization and how to judge whether such actions are appropriate. In this basic sense then, a clear identity is a precondition for external commitment. And both the strength of such commitment and the clarity of the organization's identity are increasing in the extent to which the actor has sunk investments in that identity -for example, in a distinctive logo and marketing materials; in equipment that can be used to produce one product but not others. As Selznick (1957, p. 40) writes concerning the foundations of organizational ''character'' (which he characterizes as involving ''a distinct identity'' and is the basis for its ''distinctive competence''):
hand, a wise management will readily limit its own freedom, accepting irreversible commitments, when the basic values of the organization and its direction are at stake. The acceptance of irreversible commitments is the process by which the character of the organization is set.
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A clear identity in the eyes of external observers, which is constructed via such irreversible commitments, is thus the basis for external accountability. But if a clear identity seems necessary for achieving external accountability, its importance for achieving reliability is less obvious. It is instructive in this regard to note what HF84 do not say when discussing how organizations are able to (coordinate internally and thus) achieve reliability: they do not reference the most obvious instrument for such coordination: fiat. Rather, they draw on the lessons of the Carnegie School (March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982) to suggest that internal coordination is achieved via convergence on a set of roles that organization members occupy and a set of routines for managing communication and exchanges among roles. HF84's lack of emphasis on fiat reflects a broad theme in organizational sociology, which has long noticed the absence of direct control in organizations (Child, 1972) and expressed skepticism regarding its effectiveness (on the latter, see especially Freeland, 1996 Freeland, , 2001 ). As Perrow (1986, p. 128 ) stresses (in his review of the work of March and Simon), ''the vast proportion of the activity in organizations goes on without personal directives and supervision -and even without written rules -and sometimes in permitted violation of the rules.'' Moreover, he argues that ''unobtrusive controls,'' which are rooted in a shared ''premises'' or a common ''definition of the situation'' (March & Simon, 1958 ; cf., Thomas & Thomas, 1928; Merton, 1995) , can be highly effective in coordinating action and are superior to ''direct controls'' in that the latter are more ''expensive and reactive.' ' Selznick (1957) echoes these observations. He agrees with Kaufman that internal coordination (''unity'' or ''conformity of action'') can be achieved in one of two ways: (a) by requiring that ''the membersy take all matters to a central point for a decision'' or (b) by ''carefully instill(ing) in the minds of its members an identity of outlook, a sameness of objectives, a sense of mutual obligation and of common identification and common values'' (Kaufman, 1950 , p. 226, quoted in Selznick, 1957 ; italics added). However, he stresses that the former, fiat-based approach, ''may well yield (less) flexible and efficient types of decision-making'' with a lower capacity for ''discretion in the application of policies to special circumstances'' (Selznick, 1957, p. 114) . In sum, while formal organizations can achieve coordination via fiat, most coordination is achieved without the use of direct controls, and this is as it should be since direct controls are blunt instruments. 
L i m i t e d
Moreover, Kaufman's notion of an ''identity of outlook'' suggests how a clear internal identity facilitates coordination even in the absence of direct controls. Insofar as all members have the same view of the boundaries of the organization and how it is (or should eventually be) placed relative to other organizations, much coordination can be achieved without need for fiat or even explicit discussion of the organization's purpose. Note finally that the achievement of such an identity of outlook is considerably easier than is suggested by received organization theory. The emphasis in such theory has largely been on recruitment and socialization processes, which are designed to develop a cadre of personnel that have similar views of the world (e.g., March, 1991; Harrison & Carroll, 2006; Perrow, 1986, pp. 127-128) . But there are obvious limits to such processes (e.g., Wrong, 1961) and clear downsides to having all organization members believe the same things (such conformity would limit the variation that facilitates innovation).
The good news then is that everyone need not actually have the same outlook in order for them to act as if they do. Coordination does not occur on the basis of private (or ''first order''; Ridgeway & Cornell, 2006) beliefsafter all, how can we ever know what others really believe? Rather, the foundation of coordination is common knowledge (''third-order beliefs'') -that is, what ''everyone'' knows about what ''everyone knows'' (see especially Chwe, 2001 ). For example, while faculty members may vary considerably in how they think about the university (e.g., Do we really need this or that department?), they will suppress such beliefs (and thereby convey the false impression they endorse common knowledge) as long as they believe that they are in the minority and they depend on the majority for resources. This last stipulation, that organization members will deviate from common knowledge if they feel sufficiently independent, suggests why we do see gadflies among the tenured faculty of universities. But it also suggests why university faculty, and employees of organizations, generally, often act as if they share the same views even when they do not. In particular, the heart of ''unobtrusive control'' (Perrow, 1986 ) is internal accountability -the expectation by organizational members that their actions will be reviewed according to their appropriateness. As with external accountability, the reason appropriateness matters is because performance is highly ambiguous and difficult to anticipate ex ante. And so, organizational members ''take cover'' by following convention. We keep department x because everyone knows that we are a university of type X and all such universities have such a department -even when many, if not most, faculty privately believe that the department could be removed with little loss. To this point, we have developed HF84 to suggest how a clear identity is the basis for the formal organization's achievement of reliability and accountability, and how these may be achieved without resort to direct controls. But how do insiders or outsiders ever come to any level of agreement as to what any organization ''is''? Indeed, given the fact that a large organization encompasses many human beings, with heterogeneous appearance, skills, personalities, etc., and perhaps especially given the fact that outside observers are free to place an organization in any way they like, it is astounding that any organization can attain a relatively clear identity.
Perhaps even more remarkable, it seems that the most consistent identities are those attributed to formal organizations rather than individuals.
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For example, while it is often unclear whether an individual who stands accused of a war crime is the ''same person'' as the individual who perpetrated the crimes (e.g., was Ivan Demjanjuk ''Ivan the Terrible'' of Treblinka, another ''terrible Ivan'' who committed atrocities at Sobibor, or just John Demjanjuk, a mild-mannered retired auto worker from Cleveland?; see Kulish, 2009) , there are fewer such doubts when it comes to organizations (e.g., I.G. Farben; Volkswagen; the German government), who can sometimes be induced into accepting blame for past sins even when there has been complete turnover in the biological persons who comprise them. What is responsible then for the relative consensus that typically pertains to the identity of formal organizations? As depicted in Fig. 3, I suggest that the key ingredient is that while formal organizations may have many members and many stakeholders, the right to speak on behalf of the organization is always strictly controlled. This follows from the foregoing discussion regarding the importance of common knowledge for coordination. To repeat, coordination can occur despite wide variation in private beliefs.
What matters is what is expressed publicly (see Adut, 2005) . Accordingly, two related ''voice-rights'' are crucial: the right to speak on behalf of the organization and the right to speak publicly within the organization. Consider in any organization who is allowed to send emails to all other members and who can claim that they are speaking on the organization's behalf in such communications. Observe further how the right to speak to outsiders (e.g., the press, Wall Street analysts) in an official capacity is strictly controlled. And consider what would occur were these rights to be broadly shared. Suddenly, the organization reverts to being a collection of individuals rather than a coherent ''actor.'' Since anyone can speak, and can say that they represent the organization, it becomes highly unlikely that there will be a consistent message about the organization's identity. As a result, the common knowledge that is the basis for coordination (in the absence of fiat) internally, and external commitment, evaporates. Note further that insofar as organizations engage in decoupling in order to deal with external demands without having to change their procedures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) , the concentration of voice-rights plays a key role in making this possible. Such decoupling would be threatened if internal actions and conversations were freely broadcast to the outside and/or if representations to the outside had equal weight regardless of which organization member makes them. That is, not only does the consistency of internal identity (upon which internal coordination is predicated) and the consistency of external identity (upon which external commitments are predicated) depend on a voice hierarchy, but so too does the capacity for maintaining a public face that differs from one's private face.
FIAT AS BYPRODUCT
We can now return to the question of why organizations are hierarchical. Building on HF84, I have argued that the key rights that must be concentrated in order for formal organizations to achieve the reliability and accountability that gives them their selective advantage are voice-rights. And once we recognize that voice-rights must be concentrated in order for organizations to achieve a clear (internal or external) identity, it follows why
membership-and decision-rights (''fiat'') must be concentrated as well, even if they are often ''loaned'' out (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1999) . As discussed above, it is problematic to view fiat as the basis for effective internal coordination. And it does nothing (directly) to shape outsiders' orientation to the organization since such outsiders are outside the purview of such fiat. But as depicted in Fig. 3 , the concentration of such rights is a byproduct of the need to concentrate voice-rights. That is, just as HF84 asserted that structural inertia confers no particular advantage on organizations, it seems reasonable to conjecture that fiat confers no general advantage on organizations. However, the right to direct employee behavior, and perhaps the ultimate right of firing noncompliant employees, must be concentrated if voice-rights are to be concentrated. 6 What ultimately prevents an employee from speaking to the media, or broadcasting her/his views on the organization on a company-wide email if not that she/he can be fired for speaking out of turn?
The logic of this argument can also be developed from an external perspective. Ultimately, the manager's right to fire employees is backed by the (monopoly over force enjoyed by) the state. If the manager fires an employee and the (now former) employee does not leave the premises, the police may be enlisted to remove her/him. To be sure, the state will enforce this right only if the employer abides by its rules for employer conduct. But every employer enjoys a certain latitude or ''sovereignty'' (Coleman, 1982 ; see also King et al., 2010) whereby it is recognized that employees are expected to obey orders (see Masten, 1988; Freeland, 2009) . But why does the state give such autonomy to organizations? Consider the counterfactual. If employees were free to act as they saw fit -and to claim that such actions represent the organization -then the organization could no longer be held accountable for its actions. And it may be said that the ultimate reason why accountability confers selective advantage upon formal organizations is that the state is thereby willing to treat them as fictive persons (Coleman, 1982 ; see also King et al., 2010) . But this fiction would not hold if the persons involved were a hydra-headed organism, with each mouth telling a different story about its past or future actions. Thus insofar as the state wishes to imbue organizations with accountability, the very charter of the organization must spell out who controls the right to act on behalf of the organization, and it must correspondingly be willing to enforce such rights. Finally, insofar as actions can be understood as being undertaken on behalf of an organization only when they are announced as such, the ultimate right (which must be strictly controlled) is that of voice. 
EXCEPTIONS?
The foregoing discussion is obviously too brief a treatment to do full justice to the question of why formal organizations tend to be hierarchical. At the very least, a full treatment must deal with variation in the degree of such hierarchy. Some aspect of this variation is captured in this observation by yet another famous resident of The Farm:
Stanford students often asked me about the differences between managing in business, in government, and in the university. I had a somewhat flip answer. ''In business,'' I said, ''you have to be very careful when you tell someone working for you to do something, because chances are high that he or she will actually do it. In government, you don't have to worry about that. And in the university, you aren't supposed to tell anyone to do anything in the first place. (Shultz, 1993 , p. 34 quoted in Galaskiewicz, 2008 Clearly, the difference in the low level of compliance in government and universities (at least by tenured faculty) is driven by the employees' perception that managers cannot penalize them for disobedience. But then does the weakness of hierarchy in these cases imply that they are not formal organizations? Clearly not. How then do we reconcile such weakness with the current framework? Two final points may be made in response to this question. First, while fiat may be weak in such organizations, control of voice-rights is just as concentrated as in any organization. Government bureaucrats face sharp restrictions on their ability to speak to the press on behalf of the government. Moreover, even tenured faculty cannot (credibly) speak on behalf of a university; they speak for themselves. Second, such weakness in control reflects the penetration of alternative bases for external accountability and internal coordination (cf., Galaskiewicz, 2008) . In the case of government bureaucrats, civil service rules and regulations govern conduct. In the case of university faculty, conduct is governed by professional norms. Were these alternative sources of coordination and accountability not to govern, the weakness of fiat would indeed undermine the reliability and accountability of these formal organizations. And since they do govern, they simultaneously undermine the organizational hierarchy and make it relatively unimportant for achieving the reliability and accountability needed for the organization to survive.
Thus we ultimately return to the lynchpin of HF84's analysis, with its accompanying echoes of Meyer and Rowan (1977) -that is, the selective advantage conveyed by reliability and accountability. Insofar as reliability and accountability can be attained without a formal organization, it should
be relatively unimportant to take on the guise of a formal organization. And this in turn should weaken the hierarchical features that make the formal organization possible -in particular, the concentration of voicerights. In this sense then, the Stanford School of Organizations teaches us, if implicitly, that who says organization says one voice (cf., Michels, 1962) . In reaching this conclusion, I hope I have not done an injustice to Hannan and Freeman's theory and have made at least a token gesture of repayment for all that I learned during my time on The Farm.
NOTES
1. For examples, see Baron, Hannan, and Burton (1999) on ''community,'' ''engineering,'' and ''star'' models of employment; Foss (2003) and Zenger (2002) on ''intenal hybrids''; Nickerson and Zenger (2004) on ''consensus-based hierarchy''; Ouchi (1980) on ''clan'' organizations; and Williamson (1996) on ''relational team'' organization. And see Freeland (1996 Freeland ( , 2001 ) on how the use of fiat undermines organizational effectiveness.
2. It seems an important task, though outside the scope of this essay, to compare the empirical implications of this theory with existing theories of the ''firm'' (i.e., market-oriented organization). One possible implication (based on the modified version of the theory, presented in the next section) is that insofar as firms are more likely to incorporate transactions when they involve specific investments or assets (cf., Williamson, 1996; Hart, 1995) , the reason is due less to how it changes bargaining between the parties than outsourcing such assets makes it less clear, both to insiders and outsiders, who is responsible for what. And this in turn hinders the capacity to project accountability to external audiences. More generally, this perspective shifts our attention away from the parties to a transaction and directs it to the third-parties (other organizational members; outside stakeholders such as customers and investors) who seek to interpret the transaction in order to decide how they will interact with those parties. See Freeland (2009) for a line of argument consistent with this implication.
3. It is noteworthy that while Selznick's concept of distinctive competence had much influence on the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm that emerged in the mid-1980s (see, e.g., Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994) , HF84 use this term in a different way than did Selznick -that is, as the distinctive level of reliability that formal organizations as a class are able achieve rather than a set of distinctive set of actions that a particular organization is able to achieve. It is also worth noting that while Hannan and Freeman's argument that organizations are structurally inert was highly controversial at the time, it is now basic to the RBV that any organizational competence/capability implies a corresponding inability to (change so as to) succeed at other tasks (e.g., Leonard-Barton, 1992) . This too hearkens back to Selznick, who wrote that ''Perhaps the most obvious indicator of organizational character as a palpable reality is the abandonment of old organizations and the creation of new ones when changes in general orientation are required'' 1957, p. 41) . Note finally that this implies that one does not need HF84 to explain why organizations are structurally inert. Yet, it is still an insightful framework for explaining the selective advantage of formal organizations and it can therefore be used for the current investigation of why formal organizations are hierarchical. 4. Bob Freeland points out (private communication) that such dissembling may support a minimal level of effort at coordination (''perfunctory performance''), but that high levels of effort (''consummate performance'') require that members internalize organizational myths and strongly identify with them.
5. Organizations are also the bases for the least consistent identities (e.g., the American Can Corporation ''became'' Citigroup through a series of mergers).
6. One could reasonably argue that decision-rights are thus relatively unimportant, with fiat essentially consisting of membership-rights only. This may be true to a certain extent, but the control of both membership-rights and decision-rights ultimately flow from the same legal foundation (and are therefore difficult to separate), which is the master-servant relationship (see Masten, 1988; Freeland, 2009 ). 
